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Abstract. The International Monetary Fund is one of the largest international organizations using
a weighted voting system. The weights of its 188 members are determined by a fixed amount of
basic votes plus some extra votes for so-called Special Drawing Rights (SDR). On January 26, 2016,
the conditions for the SDRs were increased at the 14th General Quota Review, which drastically
changed the corresponding voting weights. However, since the share of voting weights in general
is not equal to the influence, of a committee member on the committees overall decision, so-called
power indices were introduced. So far the power distribution of the IMF was only computed by either
approximation procedures or smaller games than then entire Board of Governors consisting of 188
members. We improve existing algorithms, based on dynamic programming, for the computation of
power indices and provide the exact results for the IMF Board of Governors before and after the
increase of voting weights. Tuned low-level details of the algorithms allow the repeated routine with
sparse computational resources and can of course be applied to other large voting bodies. It turned
out that the Banzhaf power shares are rather sensitive to changes of the quota.
Keywords: power indices, weighted voting games, International Monetary Fund, Shapley-Shubik
index, Banzhaf index, empirical game theory
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1. Introduction
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was formed in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference.
Currently this international organization consists of 188 countries as members. Its highest decision-
making body, i.e., the Board of Governors, makes its decisions by weighted voting. The weights
are composed of basic votes, which are equal for each member and sum up to 5.502 percent of the
total votes, and one additional vote for each Special Drawing Right (SDR) of 100,000 of a member
country’s quota (the IMF term for the country’s financial stake, c.f. [7]). On January 26, 2016, the
conditions for the SDRs were increased at the Board Reform Amendment, which drastically changed
the corresponding voting weights. In general the weight of a country can be a poor proxy for its
influence in a weighted voting game.1 To this end, so-called power indices were introduced in order to
measure the influence or power of a committee member in a committee making its decisions via binary
voting, i.e., each member can say “yes” or “no” to a given proposal. As the idea of power and influence
is not defined unambiguously, several power indices were introduced in the literature. Arguably,
the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index are two of the most frequently applied power indices.
Unfortunately, the evaluation of such a power index is a computational hard problem in general.2 And
indeed, we are not aware of any paper, where either the Shapley-Shubik or the Banzhaf index of the
IMF Board of Governors has been computed exactly. Approximation procedures were applied in [6, 7].
The Executive Board was, e.g., studied in [1]. In this paper we will compute the exact numerical values
of both power indices for the IMF Board of Governors corresponding to voting weights slightly after
and before the meeting on January 26, 2016. As the quota and voting shares will change as members
pay their quota increases, see https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx, we
list the used voting weights in tables 2-5.3
Algorithms for the efficient computation of power indices in voting games have been studied ex-
tensively in the literature. By looping over all 2n subsets of players, the Shapley-Shubik index of
a fixed player can be easily computed in O(n · 2n) time. The straight-forward computation of the
Banzhaf index of a fixed player can be performed in O(n2 · 2n) time. For weighted voting games









Assuming that all weights are integers and taking the sum of voting weights C into account, more
1Consider, e.g., a committee, where the weight shares are 49%, 49%, and 2%. For simple majority a least two out
of the three committee members are needed in order to push through a proposal, i.e., the influences are equal contrary
to the voting weights.
2To be more precise, the computation of the power indices treated in this paper is NP-hard in the sense of compu-
tational complexity theory. We give a brief justification at the end of Section 2.
3The voting weights were accessed at the official website https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.
aspx. The numbers were retrieved on February 17, 2016 and on July 27, 2015, respectively.
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refined complexity results can be obtained. Several algorithms based on generating functions were
implemented in Mathematica, see [10]. Those algorithms are fast if the subsets of players attain only
few different weight sums. The number of different weight sums is clearly upper bounded by C + 1.
If almost all possible weight sums are attained, then one can use the related but conceptually eas-
ier concept of dynamic programming, see [9] for a survey.4 With this, the Shapley-Shubik index of
fixed player can be determined in O(n2q) time and O(nq) space, where q ≤ C denotes the quota of
a weighted voting game. The Banzhaf index of a fixed player can be computed in O(nq) time and
O(q) space. In [11] these complexity bounds are maintained for the computation of the respective
power indices for all n players. We slightly improve upon these complexity bounds by replacing q
by min(q, C − q + 1),5 provide an easy to understand description, and extend the analysis to further
power indices. For practical efficiency we go into low-level details of the algorithms and discuss their
impact on the running time for the IMF example.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly introduce sim-
ple games as models for voting systems and some related notation. After introducing the defining
equations for the power indices, we consider algorithms for their computation in Section 3. These
are essentially based on counting the number of coalitions per weights and size by dynamic program-
ming techniques. After stating our computational results in Subsection 3.4 we draw a conclusion
in Section 4. The weights of the considered voting games and the resulting power distributions are
outsourced into an appendix due to their large size.
2. Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. A simple game (on N) is a mapping v : 2N → {0, 1} with
v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1, and v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N . A subset S ⊆ N is called coalition and
represents the set of “yes”-voters. A coalition S is called winning if v(S) = 1 and losing otherwise.
A simple game v is weighted if there exist q, w1, . . . , wn ∈ R≥0 such that v(S) = 1 iff w(S) ≥ q for
all S ⊆ N , where w(S) := ∑i∈S wi. The wi are called weights (for player i) and q is called quota.
We write v = [q;w1, . . . , wn] and remark that weights and quota are far from being unique, so that
we speak of a representation (q, w) for v. A representation with q ∈ N, w ∈ Nn≥0 is called integer
representation. It is well known that each weighted game admits an integer representation.6 We
speak of a minimum sum integer representation if the sum of weights is minimized within the class of
all integer representations. Those representations need not to be unique in general if the number of
players is not too small, see e.g. [4]. If v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j} we write i  j,
which defines a partial order. If this ordering is complete we call the simple game v complete and
remark that all weighted games are complete. A player i ∈ N is called a null player (in a simple game
v), iff v(S) = v(S ∪ {i}) for all S ⊆ N\{i}. Two players i, j ∈ n are called equivalent, denoted as
i ∼ j, if i  j and j  i. If each winning coalition contains a certain player i, she is called veto player.







|S|! · (n− |S| − 1)! · (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)).
The absolute Banzhaf index of player i is given by






v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
If we call a coalition S ⊆ N\{i} an i-swing if S is losing and S ∪ {i} winning, then Bzi(v) is equal to
the number of i-swings divided by the number of coalitions with(out) player i. Normalizing to sum
1, we obtain the (relative) Banzhaf index of player i:






4Actually, the only difference between the generating function and the dynamic programming approach is that the
former utilizes the fast-access data structures for polynomials with few coefficients implemented in computer algebra
systems. The generating function approach dates back at least to [8], where it was applied onto the electoral college.
5For the IMF Board of Governors we have q = 0.85·C, so that we obtain an acceleration of a factor of 0.85/0.15 ≈ 5.67.
The memory requirements are reduced by the same factor.
6Let (q, w) be a representation of v, let α the maximum weight of losing coalition and β the minimum weight of a
winning coalition. Increase the weights by at most (β−α)/2n > 0 so that they become rational numbers. As quota chose
an arbitrary rational number strictly between the new minimum weight of a winning coalition and the new maximum
weight of a losing coalition. Multiplication with the common denominator yields an integer representation of v.
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The two power indices have the property that they sum up to one and assign a value of zero to a
player if and only if she is a null player. Since it is NP-hard to decide whether a player is a null player
in a given weighted game, see e.g. [2], the computation of the used power indices is at least NP-hard.
We remark that the equivalent players attain the same Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf index.
3. Algorithms
Assume that we have a weighted game v = [q;w] on n players in integer representation, where we set
C =
∑n
i=1 wi. As the complexity of our subsequent algorithms will depend on ∆ := min(q, C − q+ 1)
it would be beneficial to have a minimum sum integer representation at hand. However, it is not clear
if minimizing the integer representation pays off for the computation of power indices, c.f. [5], where
this is proposed as a promising strategy. So, here we propose to perform the following computationally
cheap preprocessing steps at the very least. At first we reduce the weights that are larger then the
quota by setting q′ = q and w′i = min(q, wi) for all i ∈ N . Next we guarantee that the weights are
not too much larger than C − q. If wi > C − q, then player i is a vetoer and we set w′i = C − q + 1,
q′ = q − wi + w′i, and w′j = wj for all j ∈ N\{i}. Both operations can be performed in O(n). The
power indices used in this paper do not only assign zero power to all null players but are null player
preserving, i.e., if v′ arises from v by adding null player i, then we have Pj(v′) = Pj(v) for all j 6= i.
Nevertheless, it is NP-hard to detect null players we can efficiently remove players with a zero weight,
so that we can assume 1 ≤ wi ≤ ∆ in the following, i.e., we have C ≥ n.
In the following subsections we present the algorithmic details how to compute the power indices
efficiently.
3.1. Counting coalitions per weight. Let c(x) denote the number of coalitions of a given weighted
game v attaining weight x. By Algorithm 1 we can compute c(x) for all 0 ≤ x ≤ q in O(nq) time and
O(q+n) space, where we assume that we have precomputed the terms min{q,∑ij=1 wj} for all i ∈ N .
Input: q, w, n
Output: c(x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ q
c(0)← 1;
for 1 ≤ x ≤ q do
c(x)← 0;
end
for i from 1 to n do
for x from min{q,∑ij=1 wj} to wi do
c(x)← c(x) + c(x− wi);
end
end
Algorithm 1: Forward counting of coalitions per weight
Similarly we can compute the respective counts starting from weight C, see Algorithm 2 that needs
O(n · (C − q + 1)) time and O(C − q + 1 + n) space.
Input: q, w, n
Output: c(x) for q ≤ x ≤ C
c(C)← 1;
for q ≤ x ≤ C − 1 do
c(x)← 0;
end
for i from 1 to n do
for x from max{q + wi, C −
∑i−1
j=1 wj} to C do
c(x− wi)← c(x) + c(x− wi);
end
end
Algorithm 2: Backward counting of coalitions per weight
For the ease of notation we assume that the basic arithmetic operations for integers not too much
larger than C can be performed in O(1) time and space. However, the values stored in c(x) can
grow very quickly, i.e., we have 2n ≥ max0≤x≤C c(x) ≥ 2n/(C + 1). So, we should count Θ(n) for
each addition or subtraction. To avoid technical complications in the exposition and in order to
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be comparable with the related literature we also assume that all basic arithmetic operations for
integers can be performed in constant time. From a practical point of view we have to deal with
the corresponding problems nevertheless. In our application of the IMF we have n = 188, so that
the values of c(x) do not fit into the standard, simple data types on a 64-bit system. Since the
overhead of a general-purpose arbitrary-precision arithmetic is quite large, we directly implement the
most frequently used basic operations as follows. We choose different primes p1, . . . , pl, such that all
occurring numbers are between 0 and −1 +∏li=1 pi. During the computation we perform all basic
operations modulo pi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l. For the final result we can recover the real integers behind by
applying the Chinese remainder theorem. For our example of the IMF we choose l = 3, p1 = 2
63− 25,
p2 = 2
63 − 165, and p3 = 263 − 259.7
The number of losing coalitions is given by
∑q−1
x=0 c(x) and the number of winning coalitions is given
by
∑C
x=q c(x). Since the total number of coalitions is 2
n, both numbers can be determined in O(n∆)
time and O(∆ + n) space.
For the computation of the Banzhaf index we need to know either the number cw(x) of coalitions
with weight sum x that contain player i or the number cwo(x) of coalitions with weight sum x that
do not contain player i. For a fixed player i we set cwo(x) = 0 for 0 ≤ x < wi. By looping from wi to




Alternatively, we set cw(x) = c(x) for all C − wi < x ≤ C and recursively compute cw(x) = c(x) −




Theorem 1. The number of winning, losing coalitions and the Banzhaf indices of all players of a
weighted game v can be computed in O(n∆) time and O(∆ + n) space.
3.2. Counting coalitions per weight and size. By c(x, s) we denote the number of coalitions
of weight x and cardinality s (for a given weighted game v). Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 can be
easily adopted to this end. The running time and the memory requirements both increase by a factor
of n, since 0 ≤ s ≤ n. We remark c(x, s) = 0 for x > ∑sj=1 wj or x < ∑nj=n−s+1 wj , assuming
w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn.8 These known values can be taken into account in the boundaries of the for-loops
to save time and memory. By extending the definition and recursion for cwo(x), cw(x) to cwo(x, s),




s!(n− s− 1)! ·
q−1∑
x=q−wi
cwo(x, s) and SSIi(v) =
n−1∑
s=0
s!(n− s− 1)! ·
q+wi−1∑
x=q
cw(x, s + 1).
Of course we can precompute the factorials and the product of the n − 1 pairs of factorials. In our
fixed-precision arithmetic we first compute the sums over the cwo or cw and then switch to arbitrary-
precision arithmetic.9
Theorem 2. The SSI indices of all players of a weighted game v can be computed in O(n2∆) time
and O(n∆) space.
3.3. Intersections of weighted games. Some real-world voting systems are expressed as the in-
tersection of, say k, weighted voting games v1, . . . , vk, i.e., a coalition is winning if and only if it is
winning in all sub-games v1, . . . , vk. Let C1, . . . , Ck be the weights sums and q1, . . . , qk be the quotas
of the sub-games. By easily extending our counting functions c(x) and c(x, s) to c(x1, . . . , xk) and
c(x1, . . . , xk, s) we can go along the same lines as in the previous two subsections and obtain algo-




i=1 Ci − qi + 1
}
.
This number may grow very quickly even for moderate values of k, so that it may be crucial to choose
a representation with a small number k of sub-games. We remark that the smallest possible integer k
(for a simple game) is called dimension.
3.4. Computational results. We have applied the described algorithms for the four weighted voting
games arising from the two different sets of voting weights of the IMF in 2015 and 2016, see tables 2-5,
and quotas of either 85% or 50% of the respective weight sums.10All computations were performed
on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3720QM cpu with a clock speed of 2.60 GHz and 8 GB RAM. As a
7Choosing primes of the form 263 − x for small x, has the advantage that the computations can be performed
using the standard, simple data type unsigned long in C++. Our choices are indeed the largest possibilities, see e.g.
https://primes.utm.edu/lists/2small/0bit.html. We remark that a na¨ıve checking of the primality of the pi was
performed in 41 seconds. We implement a = b+ c mod p as a = b+ c and if a ≥ p then a− = p.
8The players can be sorted in O(n+ ∆) time and space in a preprocessing step.
9We remark s!(n− s− 1)! < 2n log2 n for n > 1.
10According to the type of the decision different values for q are used, see e.g. [7].
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a general-purpose programming language we have chosen C++ and used the CLN-library11 for the
arbitrary-precision arithmetic parts.
For 2016 and super-majority, i.e., q = 85%, Algorithm 1 needed 4.73 seconds and Algorithm 2
needed 0.67 seconds. The acceleration factor for using the described tailored fixed-precision arith-
metic over an arbitrary-precision arithmetic is slightly larger than 6. Using pointers instead of the
STL class vector results in a speed-up of roughly 2. The number of winning coalitions is given by
4506727722110247822679513808100007271801182981184082. The entire Banzhaf computation, based
on Algorithm 2, for all players was performed in less than 3 seconds. The corresponding SSI compu-
tation took less than 7 minutes.
We have listed the power distributions for the years 2015 and 2016, the cases of super-majority and
simple majority, the power indices Bz and SSI in tables 6-9 using a precision of five decimal digits
for the output. The power of a few countries seem to coincide, which is a numerical artefact, except
for France (i = 58) and the United Kingdom (i = 179). To be more precise, those two countries have
the same weights in both 2015 and 2016, so that they are equivalent for all values of the quota q.
For super-majority and simple majority all other countries are inequivalent, which may be seen at
the exact values of either the Banzhaf or the Shapley-Shubik index. We have written out the exact
integers Bzai for the super-majority case in tables 10-13. As predicted by theory, all values have the





as an example for the United States in 2015 in the super-majority case. The remaining exact values
can be obtained from the author upon request.
Having a closer look at the different power distributions we observe that the choice of the power
index or the quota as well as the modified weights have a significant impact. The dominance of
the United states has further increased from 2015 to 2016. Interestingly enough, the Banzhaf power
in the super-majority cases shows almost no difference to, e.g., Japan, which is different for the
Shapley-Shubik index. To obtain a more complete, but still compact, overview about the differences
we have introduced ∆P qy (I) :=
∑
i∈I
∣∣Bzi(vqy)− SSIi(vqy)∣∣, ∆ Bzq(I) := ∑i∈I |Bzi(vq2015)− Bzi(vq2016)|,
and ∆ SSIq(I) :=
∑
i∈I |SSIi(vq2015)− SSIi(vq2016)|, where q ∈ {85%, 50%}, y ∈ {2015, 2016}, and vqy
denotes the corresponding weighted game of the IMF. We evaluate those values on the entire set of
countries N and on all countries except the biggest five (United States, Japan, Germany, France,
United Kingdom) N , see Table 1.
Table 1. Differences in power between years and power indices
set of countries I ∆P 85%2015 ∆P
85%
2016 ∆ Bz




N 54.33% 51.98% 19.90% 27.00% 9.46% 32.21% 46.52% 34.68%
N 28.48% 26.17% 18.45% 17.67% 2.68% 9.70% 18.35% 18.00%
The stated running times can be easily extrapolated to other examples. If we assume a hypothetical
IMF consisting of 1000 members whose weights are of similar magnitude as in the 2016 example, then
both n and ∆ increase by a factor of 1000/188. Instead of three primes we would need 16 primes, so
that the computation of the Banzhaf indices in the super-majority case would took approximately 8
minutes while the SSI indices may be computed in 4 days.12
The minuscule running time for the Banzhaf index obviously allows more sophisticated applications
where the power index computation is performed several times. Trying to heuristically solve the inverse
power index problem, where weights need to be found whose power distribution is close to a given
target distribution, is just an example. Here we have computed the Banzhaf power distribution of
the IMF when the quota changes from 0% to 100% in steps of 0.1%, i.e., 1001 evaluations have been
performed, as another possible application. In figures 1-2 we have depicted the corresponding power
for the five most powerful countries (United States i = 180, Japan i = 82, Germany i = 62, France
i = 58, United Kingdom i = 179). We can see that the respective Banzhaf indices are rather volatile
11CLN - Class Library for Numbers, available at http://www.ginac.de/CLN.
12In the latter case the memory requirements might become a serious issue if the computations for the different
primes are not performed consecutively. Computing the intermediate results for each prime in parallel is the better
option anyway. Using 16 computers (or cores) the mentioned times reduce to seconds and less than 7 hours, respectively.
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Figure 1. Banzhaf power distribution of the IMF in 2015 for the five largest countries
with variable quota
with respect to changes of the quota. The difference between the respective Banzhaf power shares
is negligible for Japan and Germany, while there is no difference between France and the United
Kingdom, for all values of the quota q. For an extreme quota of 0% or 100% all countries obtain
exactly the same Banzhaf power share. For quotas below 15% or above 85% there is almost no
difference in power for the five largest countries. However, there is a critical interval, say q between
25% and 75%, where the relative power distribution between the five largest countries is very sensitive
to changes of the quota. The United States most intensive benefit from quotas around 50%. In 2016
also the Banzhaf power share of Japan is very sensitive to changes of the quota. Instead of 50% a
quota of roughly 65% would be rather favorable for them.
Figure 2. Banzhaf power distribution of the IMF in 2016 for the five largest countries
with variable quota
4. Conclusions
Nevertheless the computation of both the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index is NP-hard for
weighted voting games, we have demonstrated that in practice it is not too hard to compute the exact
values if the considered games are not too large. In the used sense, the current IMF voting system is
definitely not too large since the Banzhaf indices can be computed in seconds and the Shapley-Shubik
indices can be computed in a few minutes. For weighted games of that magnitude no approximations
to the real values are necessary.
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Even more, an efficient computation does not rely on sophisticated algorithms but low-level details
in order to gain speed-up factors. For C  2n, which should be the case for all non-tiny real–world
examples, the use of generating function approaches yields no benefit, although being a common topic
in the literature. The used underlying idea of counting coalitions per weight and size by a simple
recursion was just enhanced by allowing the reverse direction starting from the weight sum C for
quotas larger than 50%. There is a single small insight that allows to recover those counts for the
cases where a certain player is either assumed to be part or not to be part of the counted coalitions
more efficiently than a direct enumeration. Using this approach the complexity for computing the
considered indices are (up to a small constant) the same for a single player and all players.
For our real–world example of the IMF, the resulting power distributions are rather different from
the weight shares and between diverse power indices like the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index.
We suspect that this is not a numerical artefact of this specific example, so that it might be a good
idea to compute several power indices to get a more comprehensive view whenever the considered
committee has some non-negligible impact.
The distribution of the Banzhaf power shares is rather sensitive to changes of the quota and there
are clear incentives for the few largest countries to alter them in their sense. The conclusion that
may be drawn from that fact is debatable and the choice of the quota should indeed obtain more
consideration.
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Table 2. Voting weights in the IMF – part 1
index member/year 2015 2016
1 Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of 2357 0.094% 2665 0.075%
2 Albania 1338 0.053% 2439 0.068%
3 Algeria 13285 0.527% 13593 0.380%
4 Angola 3601 0.143% 3909 0.109%
5 Antigua and Barbuda 873 0.035% 1246 0.035%
6 Argentina 21909 0.869% 22217 0.622%
7 Armenia 1658 0.066% 1966 0.055%
8 Australia 33102 1.313% 66770 1.869%
9 Austria 21877 0.868% 22185 0.621%
10 Azerbaijan 2347 0.093% 2655 0.074%
11 Bahamas, The 2041 0.081% 2870 0.080%
12 Bahrain 2088 0.083% 2396 0.067%
13 Bangladesh 6071 0.241% 6379 0.179%
14 Barbados 1413 0.056% 1991 0.056%
15 Belarus 4602 0.183% 4910 0.137%
16 Belgium 46790 1.856% 47098 1.318%
17 Belize 926 0.037% 1313 0.037%
18 Benin 1357 0.054% 1665 0.047%
19 Bhutan 801 0.032% 1109 0.031%
20 Bolivia 2453 0.097% 2761 0.077%
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2429 0.096% 2737 0.077%
22 Botswana 1616 0.064% 3018 0.084%
23 Brazil 43243 1.716% 43551 1.219%
24 Brunei Darussalam 2890 0.115% 3198 0.090%
25 Bulgaria 7140 0.283% 7448 0.208%
26 Burkina Faso 1340 0.053% 1648 0.046%
27 Burundi 1508 0.060% 1816 0.051%
28 Cabo Verde 850 0.034% 1158 0.032%
29 Cambodia 1613 0.064% 2796 0.078%
30 Cameroon 2595 0.103% 2903 0.081%
31 Canada 64430 2.556% 111285 3.115%
32 Central African Republic 1295 0.051% 1603 0.045%
33 Chad 1404 0.056% 2448 0.069%
34 Chile 9299 0.369% 18489 0.517%
35 China 95997 3.809% 96305 2.695%
36 Colombia 8478 0.336% 21491 0.601%
37 Comoros 827 0.033% 1224 0.034%
38 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 6068 0.241% 6376 0.178%
39 Congo, Republic of 1584 0.063% 1892 0.053%
40 Costa Rica 2379 0.094% 2687 0.075%
41 Coˆte d’Ivoire 3990 0.158% 4298 0.120%
42 Croatia 4389 0.174% 4697 0.131%
43 Cyprus 2320 0.092% 4084 0.114%
44 Czech Republic 10760 0.427% 11068 0.310%
45 Denmark 19652 0.780% 35440 0.992%
46 Djibouti 897 0.036% 1364 0.038%
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Table 3. Voting weights in the IMF – part 2
index member/year 2015 2016
47 Dominica 820 0.033% 1161 0.032%
48 Dominican Republic 2927 0.116% 3235 0.091%
49 Ecuador 4216 0.167% 4524 0.127%
50 Egypt 10175 0.404% 10483 0.293%
51 El Salvador 2451 0.097% 2759 0.077%
52 Equatorial Guinea 1261 0.050% 1569 0.044%
53 Eritrea 897 0.036% 1205 0.034%
54 Estonia 1677 0.067% 3482 0.097%
55 Ethiopia 2075 0.082% 4053 0.113%
56 Fiji, Republic of 1441 0.057% 1749 0.049%
57 Finland 13376 0.531% 13684 0.383%
58 France 108123 4.290% 108431 3.035%
59 Gabon 2281 0.090% 3206 0.090%
60 Gambia, The 1049 0.042% 1357 0.038%
61 Georgia 2241 0.089% 3150 0.088%
62 Germany 146393 5.808% 146701 4.106%
63 Ghana 4428 0.176% 4736 0.133%
64 Greece 11756 0.466% 25335 0.709%
65 Grenada 855 0.034% 1163 0.033%
66 Guatemala 2840 0.113% 3148 0.088%
67 Guinea 1809 0.072% 3188 0.089%
68 Guinea-Bissau 880 0.035% 1188 0.033%
69 Guyana 1647 0.065% 2864 0.080%
70 Haiti 1557 0.062% 1865 0.052%
71 Honduras 2033 0.081% 2341 0.066%
72 Hungary 11122 0.441% 20446 0.572%
73 Iceland 1914 0.076% 4264 0.119%
74 India 58953 2.339% 59261 1.659%
75 Indonesia 21531 0.854% 21839 0.611%
76 Iran, Islamic Republic of 15710 0.623% 16018 0.448%
77 Iraq 12622 0.501% 12930 0.362%
78 Ireland 13314 0.528% 13622 0.381%
79 Israel 11349 0.450% 20255 0.567%
80 Italy 79561 3.156% 79869 2.235%
81 Jamaica 3473 0.138% 4875 0.136%
82 Japan 157023 6.230% 309251 8.655%
83 Jordan 2443 0.097% 4477 0.125%
84 Kazakhstan 5016 0.199% 5324 0.149%
85 Kenya 3452 0.137% 3760 0.105%
86 Kiribati 794 0.032% 1102 0.031%
87 Korea 34402 1.365% 34710 0.971%
88 Kosovo 1328 0.053% 1636 0.046%
89 Kuwait 14549 0.577% 14857 0.416%
90 Kyrgyz Republic 1626 0.065% 1934 0.054%
91 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1267 0.050% 1575 0.044%
92 Latvia 2159 0.086% 2467 0.069%
93 Lebanon 3402 0.135% 3710 0.104%
94 Lesotho 1087 0.043% 1395 0.039%
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Table 4. Voting weights in the IMF – part 3
index member/year 2015 2016
95 Liberia 2030 0.081% 2338 0.065%
96 Libya 11975 0.475% 12283 0.344%
97 Lithuania 2577 0.102% 5462 0.153%
98 Luxembourg 4925 0.195% 5233 0.146%
99 Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of 1427 0.057% 2449 0.069%
100 Madagascar 1960 0.078% 2268 0.063%
101 Malawi 1432 0.057% 2434 0.068%
102 Malaysia 18477 0.733% 18785 0.526%
103 Maldives 838 0.033% 1146 0.032%
104 Mali 1671 0.066% 1979 0.055%
105 Malta 1758 0.070% 2066 0.058%
106 Marshall Islands 773 0.031% 1081 0.030%
107 Mauritania 1382 0.055% 1690 0.047%
108 Mauritius 1754 0.070% 2468 0.069%
109 Mexico 36995 1.468% 90173 2.524%
110 Micronesia, Federated States of 789 0.031% 1097 0.031%
111 Moldova 1970 0.078% 2278 0.064%
112 Mongolia 1249 0.050% 1557 0.044%
113 Montenegro 1013 0.040% 1651 0.046%
114 Morocco 6620 0.263% 9990 0.280%
115 Mozambique 1874 0.074% 2182 0.061%
116 Myanmar 3322 0.132% 6214 0.174%
117 Namibia 2103 0.083% 2411 0.067%
118 Nepal 1451 0.058% 1759 0.049%
119 Netherlands 52362 2.077% 88411 2.474%
120 New Zealand 9684 0.384% 9992 0.280%
121 Nicaragua 2038 0.081% 2346 0.066%
122 Niger 1396 0.055% 1704 0.048%
123 Nigeria 18270 0.725% 18578 0.520%
124 Norway 19575 0.777% 19883 0.556%
125 Oman 3108 0.123% 3416 0.096%
126 Pakistan 11075 0.439% 21356 0.598%
127 Palau 769 0.031% 1077 0.030%
128 Panama 2804 0.111% 3112 0.087%
129 Papua New Guinea 2054 0.081% 2362 0.066%
130 Paraguay 1737 0.069% 2045 0.057%
131 Peru 7122 0.283% 14391 0.403%
132 Philippines 10931 0.434% 11239 0.315%
133 Poland 17622 0.699% 42000 1.176%
134 Portugal 11035 0.438% 21647 0.606%
135 Qatar 3764 0.149% 4072 0.114%
136 Romania 11040 0.438% 19160 0.536%
137 Russian Federation 60192 2.388% 60500 1.693%
138 Rwanda 1539 0.061% 1847 0.052%
139 Samoa 854 0.034% 1162 0.033%
140 San Marino 962 0.038% 1538 0.043%
141 Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe 812 0.032% 1194 0.033%
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Table 5. Voting weights in the IMF – part 4
index member/year 2015 2016
142 Saudi Arabia 70593 2.801% 70901 1.984%
143 Senegal 2356 0.093% 2664 0.075%
144 Serbia 5415 0.215% 7594 0.213%
145 Seychelles 847 0.034% 1275 0.036%
146 Sierra Leone 1775 0.070% 2083 0.058%
147 Singapore 14818 0.588% 15126 0.423%
148 Slovak Republic 5013 0.199% 5321 0.149%
149 Slovenia 3488 0.138% 3796 0.106%
150 Solomon Islands 842 0.033% 1150 0.032%
151 Somalia 1180 0.047% 1488 0.042%
152 South Africa 19423 0.771% 19731 0.552%
153 South Sudan, Republic of 1968 0.078% 2276 0.064%
154 Spain 40972 1.626% 96401 2.698%
155 Sri Lanka 4872 0.193% 5180 0.145%
156 St. Kitts and Nevis 827 0.033% 1135 0.032%
157 St. Lucia 891 0.035% 1199 0.034%
158 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 821 0.033% 1129 0.032%
159 Sudan 2435 0.097% 2743 0.077%
160 Suriname 1659 0.066% 1967 0.055%
161 Swaziland 1245 0.049% 1831 0.051%
162 Sweden 24693 0.980% 45346 1.269%
163 Switzerland 35323 1.401% 58757 1.645%
164 Syrian Arab Republic 3674 0.146% 3982 0.111%
165 Tajikistan 1608 0.064% 1916 0.054%
166 Tanzania 2727 0.108% 3035 0.085%
167 Thailand 15143 0.601% 15451 0.432%
168 Timor-Leste 846 0.034% 1154 0.032%
169 Togo 1472 0.058% 1780 0.050%
170 Tonga 807 0.032% 1115 0.031%
171 Trinidad and Tobago 4094 0.162% 4402 0.123%
172 Tunisia 3603 0.143% 3911 0.109%
173 Turkey 15296 0.607% 15604 0.437%
174 Turkmenistan 1490 0.059% 3432 0.096%
175 Tuvalu 756 0.030% 1064 0.030%
176 Uganda 2543 0.101% 2851 0.080%
177 Ukraine 14458 0.574% 21164 0.592%
178 United Arab Emirates 8263 0.328% 8571 0.240%
179 United Kingdom 108123 4.290% 108431 3.035%
180 United States 421962 16.741% 830988 23.258%
181 Uruguay 3803 0.151% 5337 0.149%
182 Uzbekistan 3494 0.139% 3802 0.106%
183 Vanuatu 908 0.036% 1216 0.034%
184 Venezuela, Repu´blica Bolivariana de 27329 1.084% 27637 0.774%
185 Vietnam 5345 0.212% 5653 0.158%
186 Yemen, Republic of 3173 0.126% 3481 0.097%
187 Zambia 5629 0.223% 5937 0.166%
188 Zimbabwe 4272 0.169% 4580 0.128%
total 2520571 100.000% 3572928 100.000%
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Table 6. Voting power in the IMF – part 1
supermajority simple majority
Bzi SSIi Bzi SSIi
i 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016
1 0.153% 0.126% 0.088% 0.074% 0.086% 0.056% 0.088% 0.067%
2 0.087% 0.115% 0.050% 0.068% 0.049% 0.051% 0.050% 0.062%
3 0.845% 0.634% 0.497% 0.378% 0.483% 0.286% 0.501% 0.345%
4 0.234% 0.184% 0.134% 0.108% 0.131% 0.082% 0.135% 0.099%
5 0.057% 0.059% 0.032% 0.034% 0.032% 0.026% 0.033% 0.032%
6 1.342% 1.021% 0.824% 0.621% 0.796% 0.467% 0.828% 0.565%
7 0.108% 0.093% 0.062% 0.054% 0.060% 0.041% 0.062% 0.050%
8 1.882% 2.522% 1.254% 1.906% 1.202% 1.390% 1.256% 1.714%
9 1.340% 1.019% 0.823% 0.620% 0.795% 0.466% 0.827% 0.564%
10 0.153% 0.125% 0.087% 0.074% 0.085% 0.056% 0.088% 0.067%
11 0.133% 0.135% 0.076% 0.079% 0.074% 0.060% 0.077% 0.073%
12 0.136% 0.113% 0.078% 0.066% 0.076% 0.050% 0.078% 0.061%
13 0.393% 0.300% 0.226% 0.177% 0.221% 0.134% 0.228% 0.162%
14 0.092% 0.094% 0.052% 0.055% 0.051% 0.042% 0.053% 0.050%
15 0.298% 0.231% 0.171% 0.136% 0.167% 0.103% 0.173% 0.124%
16 2.349% 1.982% 1.789% 1.331% 1.698% 0.986% 1.785% 1.204%
17 0.060% 0.062% 0.034% 0.036% 0.034% 0.028% 0.035% 0.033%
18 0.088% 0.078% 0.050% 0.046% 0.049% 0.035% 0.051% 0.042%
19 0.052% 0.052% 0.030% 0.031% 0.029% 0.023% 0.030% 0.028%
20 0.159% 0.130% 0.091% 0.076% 0.089% 0.058% 0.092% 0.070%
21 0.158% 0.129% 0.090% 0.076% 0.088% 0.058% 0.091% 0.069%
22 0.105% 0.142% 0.060% 0.084% 0.059% 0.064% 0.061% 0.076%
23 2.249% 1.863% 1.649% 1.229% 1.570% 0.912% 1.647% 1.112%
24 0.188% 0.151% 0.107% 0.089% 0.105% 0.067% 0.109% 0.081%
25 0.461% 0.350% 0.266% 0.207% 0.259% 0.157% 0.268% 0.189%
26 0.087% 0.078% 0.050% 0.046% 0.049% 0.035% 0.050% 0.042%
27 0.098% 0.086% 0.056% 0.050% 0.055% 0.038% 0.057% 0.046%
28 0.055% 0.055% 0.032% 0.032% 0.031% 0.024% 0.032% 0.029%
29 0.105% 0.132% 0.060% 0.077% 0.059% 0.059% 0.061% 0.071%
30 0.169% 0.137% 0.096% 0.080% 0.094% 0.061% 0.097% 0.073%
31 2.667% 3.073% 2.492% 3.249% 2.335% 2.266% 2.474% 2.885%
32 0.084% 0.076% 0.048% 0.044% 0.047% 0.034% 0.049% 0.041%
33 0.091% 0.115% 0.052% 0.068% 0.051% 0.052% 0.053% 0.062%
34 0.598% 0.856% 0.347% 0.516% 0.338% 0.389% 0.350% 0.470%
35 2.828% 2.967% 3.796% 2.790% 3.462% 1.979% 3.730% 2.488%
36 0.546% 0.989% 0.316% 0.600% 0.308% 0.452% 0.319% 0.546%
37 0.054% 0.058% 0.031% 0.034% 0.030% 0.026% 0.031% 0.031%
38 0.393% 0.300% 0.226% 0.177% 0.221% 0.134% 0.228% 0.161%
39 0.103% 0.089% 0.059% 0.052% 0.058% 0.040% 0.059% 0.048%
40 0.155% 0.127% 0.088% 0.074% 0.086% 0.057% 0.089% 0.068%
41 0.259% 0.202% 0.148% 0.119% 0.145% 0.090% 0.150% 0.109%
42 0.285% 0.221% 0.163% 0.130% 0.159% 0.099% 0.165% 0.119%
43 0.151% 0.192% 0.086% 0.113% 0.084% 0.086% 0.087% 0.103%
44 0.690% 0.518% 0.402% 0.308% 0.391% 0.233% 0.405% 0.281%
45 1.218% 1.566% 0.738% 0.996% 0.714% 0.744% 0.742% 0.903%
46 0.058% 0.064% 0.033% 0.038% 0.033% 0.029% 0.034% 0.035%
47 0.053% 0.055% 0.030% 0.032% 0.030% 0.024% 0.031% 0.029%
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Table 7. Voting power in the IMF – part 2
supermajority simple majority
Bzi SSIi Bzi SSIi
i 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016
48 0.190% 0.152% 0.109% 0.090% 0.106% 0.068% 0.110% 0.082%
49 0.274% 0.213% 0.157% 0.125% 0.153% 0.095% 0.158% 0.115%
50 0.653% 0.491% 0.380% 0.291% 0.370% 0.221% 0.383% 0.266%
51 0.159% 0.130% 0.091% 0.076% 0.089% 0.058% 0.092% 0.070%
52 0.082% 0.074% 0.047% 0.043% 0.046% 0.033% 0.047% 0.040%
53 0.058% 0.057% 0.033% 0.033% 0.033% 0.025% 0.034% 0.030%
54 0.109% 0.164% 0.062% 0.096% 0.061% 0.073% 0.063% 0.088%
55 0.135% 0.191% 0.077% 0.112% 0.075% 0.085% 0.078% 0.103%
56 0.094% 0.082% 0.054% 0.048% 0.052% 0.037% 0.054% 0.044%
57 0.851% 0.639% 0.500% 0.381% 0.486% 0.288% 0.504% 0.347%
58 2.842% 3.057% 4.314% 3.161% 3.888% 2.212% 4.221% 2.809%
59 0.148% 0.151% 0.085% 0.089% 0.083% 0.067% 0.086% 0.081%
60 0.068% 0.064% 0.039% 0.038% 0.038% 0.029% 0.039% 0.034%
61 0.146% 0.148% 0.083% 0.087% 0.081% 0.066% 0.084% 0.080%
62 2.850% 3.173% 6.017% 4.364% 5.172% 2.890% 5.803% 3.834%
63 0.287% 0.223% 0.165% 0.131% 0.161% 0.100% 0.166% 0.120%
64 0.751% 1.155% 0.439% 0.709% 0.427% 0.532% 0.443% 0.644%
65 0.056% 0.055% 0.032% 0.032% 0.031% 0.024% 0.032% 0.029%
66 0.184% 0.148% 0.106% 0.087% 0.103% 0.066% 0.107% 0.080%
67 0.118% 0.150% 0.067% 0.088% 0.066% 0.067% 0.068% 0.081%
68 0.057% 0.056% 0.033% 0.033% 0.032% 0.025% 0.033% 0.030%
69 0.107% 0.135% 0.061% 0.079% 0.060% 0.060% 0.062% 0.072%
70 0.101% 0.088% 0.058% 0.052% 0.057% 0.039% 0.058% 0.047%
71 0.132% 0.110% 0.076% 0.065% 0.074% 0.049% 0.076% 0.059%
72 0.712% 0.943% 0.416% 0.571% 0.404% 0.430% 0.419% 0.519%
73 0.124% 0.201% 0.071% 0.118% 0.070% 0.090% 0.072% 0.108%
74 2.596% 2.341% 2.272% 1.685% 2.137% 1.237% 2.259% 1.519%
75 1.322% 1.004% 0.810% 0.610% 0.782% 0.459% 0.814% 0.555%
76 0.991% 0.745% 0.589% 0.446% 0.571% 0.337% 0.593% 0.407%
77 0.805% 0.604% 0.472% 0.360% 0.459% 0.272% 0.476% 0.328%
78 0.847% 0.636% 0.498% 0.379% 0.484% 0.287% 0.502% 0.346%
79 0.726% 0.934% 0.424% 0.565% 0.412% 0.426% 0.427% 0.515%
80 2.781% 2.768% 3.109% 2.295% 2.877% 1.655% 3.072% 2.056%
81 0.225% 0.229% 0.129% 0.135% 0.126% 0.103% 0.130% 0.123%
82 2.851% 3.198% 6.511% 10.262% 5.494% 4.103% 6.251% 8.370%
83 0.159% 0.211% 0.091% 0.124% 0.089% 0.094% 0.092% 0.113%
84 0.325% 0.251% 0.187% 0.148% 0.182% 0.112% 0.188% 0.135%
85 0.224% 0.177% 0.128% 0.104% 0.125% 0.079% 0.130% 0.095%
86 0.052% 0.052% 0.029% 0.030% 0.029% 0.023% 0.030% 0.028%
87 1.936% 1.537% 1.304% 0.975% 1.249% 0.728% 1.306% 0.885%
88 0.086% 0.077% 0.049% 0.045% 0.048% 0.034% 0.050% 0.041%
89 0.921% 0.692% 0.545% 0.414% 0.529% 0.312% 0.549% 0.377%
90 0.106% 0.091% 0.060% 0.054% 0.059% 0.041% 0.061% 0.049%
91 0.082% 0.074% 0.047% 0.044% 0.046% 0.033% 0.048% 0.040%
92 0.140% 0.116% 0.080% 0.068% 0.078% 0.052% 0.081% 0.062%
93 0.221% 0.175% 0.127% 0.103% 0.124% 0.078% 0.128% 0.094%
94 0.071% 0.066% 0.040% 0.039% 0.040% 0.029% 0.041% 0.035%
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Table 8. Voting power in the IMF – part 3
supermajority simple majority
Bzi SSIi Bzi SSIi
i 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016
95 0.132% 0.110% 0.075% 0.065% 0.074% 0.049% 0.076% 0.059%
96 0.765% 0.574% 0.448% 0.342% 0.435% 0.258% 0.451% 0.312%
97 0.167% 0.257% 0.096% 0.151% 0.094% 0.115% 0.097% 0.138%
98 0.319% 0.246% 0.183% 0.145% 0.179% 0.110% 0.185% 0.133%
99 0.093% 0.115% 0.053% 0.068% 0.052% 0.052% 0.054% 0.062%
100 0.127% 0.107% 0.073% 0.063% 0.071% 0.048% 0.074% 0.057%
101 0.093% 0.115% 0.053% 0.067% 0.052% 0.051% 0.054% 0.062%
102 1.151% 0.869% 0.694% 0.524% 0.671% 0.395% 0.698% 0.477%
103 0.054% 0.054% 0.031% 0.032% 0.030% 0.024% 0.031% 0.029%
104 0.109% 0.093% 0.062% 0.055% 0.061% 0.042% 0.063% 0.050%
105 0.114% 0.097% 0.065% 0.057% 0.064% 0.043% 0.066% 0.052%
106 0.050% 0.051% 0.029% 0.030% 0.028% 0.023% 0.029% 0.027%
107 0.090% 0.080% 0.051% 0.047% 0.050% 0.036% 0.052% 0.043%
108 0.114% 0.116% 0.065% 0.068% 0.064% 0.052% 0.066% 0.062%
109 2.037% 2.905% 1.405% 2.604% 1.343% 1.859% 1.406% 2.327%
110 0.051% 0.052% 0.029% 0.030% 0.029% 0.023% 0.030% 0.028%
111 0.128% 0.107% 0.073% 0.063% 0.072% 0.048% 0.074% 0.058%
112 0.081% 0.073% 0.046% 0.043% 0.045% 0.033% 0.047% 0.039%
113 0.066% 0.078% 0.038% 0.046% 0.037% 0.035% 0.038% 0.042%
114 0.428% 0.468% 0.247% 0.278% 0.241% 0.210% 0.249% 0.253%
115 0.122% 0.103% 0.070% 0.060% 0.068% 0.046% 0.070% 0.055%
116 0.216% 0.292% 0.124% 0.172% 0.121% 0.131% 0.125% 0.157%
117 0.137% 0.114% 0.078% 0.067% 0.076% 0.051% 0.079% 0.061%
118 0.094% 0.083% 0.054% 0.049% 0.053% 0.037% 0.054% 0.045%
119 2.479% 2.884% 2.009% 2.551% 1.899% 1.824% 2.001% 2.280%
120 0.622% 0.468% 0.362% 0.278% 0.352% 0.210% 0.364% 0.253%
121 0.132% 0.111% 0.076% 0.065% 0.074% 0.049% 0.076% 0.059%
122 0.091% 0.080% 0.052% 0.047% 0.051% 0.036% 0.052% 0.043%
123 1.140% 0.860% 0.686% 0.518% 0.664% 0.391% 0.690% 0.472%
124 1.214% 0.918% 0.735% 0.555% 0.711% 0.418% 0.739% 0.505%
125 0.202% 0.161% 0.116% 0.095% 0.113% 0.072% 0.117% 0.086%
126 0.709% 0.983% 0.414% 0.596% 0.402% 0.449% 0.417% 0.543%
127 0.050% 0.051% 0.029% 0.030% 0.028% 0.023% 0.029% 0.027%
128 0.182% 0.147% 0.104% 0.086% 0.102% 0.065% 0.105% 0.079%
129 0.133% 0.111% 0.076% 0.065% 0.075% 0.050% 0.077% 0.060%
130 0.113% 0.096% 0.065% 0.057% 0.063% 0.043% 0.065% 0.052%
131 0.460% 0.671% 0.265% 0.401% 0.259% 0.303% 0.268% 0.365%
132 0.700% 0.526% 0.408% 0.312% 0.397% 0.236% 0.412% 0.285%
133 1.102% 1.808% 0.661% 1.184% 0.640% 0.880% 0.665% 1.072%
134 0.707% 0.996% 0.412% 0.605% 0.401% 0.455% 0.416% 0.550%
135 0.244% 0.192% 0.140% 0.113% 0.137% 0.086% 0.141% 0.103%
136 0.707% 0.886% 0.412% 0.534% 0.401% 0.403% 0.416% 0.487%
137 2.613% 2.373% 2.321% 1.722% 2.182% 1.262% 2.307% 1.551%
138 0.100% 0.087% 0.057% 0.051% 0.056% 0.039% 0.058% 0.047%
139 0.056% 0.055% 0.032% 0.032% 0.031% 0.024% 0.032% 0.029%
140 0.063% 0.072% 0.036% 0.043% 0.035% 0.032% 0.036% 0.039%
141 0.053% 0.056% 0.030% 0.033% 0.030% 0.025% 0.030% 0.030%
COMPUTING THE POWER DISTRIBUTION IN THE IMF 15
Table 9. Voting power in the IMF – part 4
supermajority simple majority
Bzi SSIi Bzi SSIi
i 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016
142 2.725% 2.609% 2.742% 2.028% 2.556% 1.474% 2.717% 1.821%
143 0.153% 0.126% 0.088% 0.074% 0.086% 0.056% 0.088% 0.067%
144 0.351% 0.357% 0.202% 0.211% 0.197% 0.160% 0.204% 0.192%
145 0.055% 0.060% 0.031% 0.035% 0.031% 0.027% 0.032% 0.032%
146 0.115% 0.098% 0.066% 0.058% 0.065% 0.044% 0.067% 0.053%
147 0.937% 0.704% 0.555% 0.421% 0.538% 0.318% 0.559% 0.384%
148 0.325% 0.250% 0.187% 0.147% 0.182% 0.112% 0.188% 0.135%
149 0.226% 0.179% 0.130% 0.105% 0.127% 0.080% 0.131% 0.096%
150 0.055% 0.054% 0.031% 0.032% 0.031% 0.024% 0.032% 0.029%
151 0.077% 0.070% 0.044% 0.041% 0.043% 0.031% 0.044% 0.038%
152 1.205% 0.911% 0.729% 0.551% 0.706% 0.415% 0.734% 0.501%
153 0.128% 0.107% 0.073% 0.063% 0.072% 0.048% 0.074% 0.058%
154 2.177% 2.968% 1.560% 2.793% 1.487% 1.981% 1.560% 2.491%
155 0.316% 0.244% 0.181% 0.144% 0.177% 0.109% 0.183% 0.131%
156 0.054% 0.053% 0.031% 0.031% 0.030% 0.024% 0.031% 0.029%
157 0.058% 0.057% 0.033% 0.033% 0.032% 0.025% 0.033% 0.030%
158 0.053% 0.053% 0.030% 0.031% 0.030% 0.024% 0.031% 0.029%
159 0.158% 0.129% 0.090% 0.076% 0.088% 0.058% 0.091% 0.069%
160 0.108% 0.093% 0.062% 0.054% 0.060% 0.041% 0.062% 0.050%
161 0.081% 0.086% 0.046% 0.051% 0.045% 0.039% 0.047% 0.046%
162 1.489% 1.924% 0.930% 1.281% 0.897% 0.950% 0.934% 1.158%
163 1.973% 2.328% 1.340% 1.671% 1.283% 1.226% 1.342% 1.505%
164 0.238% 0.188% 0.137% 0.110% 0.134% 0.084% 0.138% 0.101%
165 0.105% 0.090% 0.060% 0.053% 0.058% 0.040% 0.060% 0.048%
166 0.177% 0.143% 0.101% 0.084% 0.099% 0.064% 0.102% 0.077%
167 0.957% 0.719% 0.567% 0.430% 0.550% 0.325% 0.571% 0.392%
168 0.055% 0.054% 0.031% 0.032% 0.031% 0.024% 0.032% 0.029%
169 0.096% 0.084% 0.055% 0.049% 0.053% 0.037% 0.055% 0.045%
170 0.052% 0.053% 0.030% 0.031% 0.029% 0.023% 0.030% 0.028%
171 0.266% 0.207% 0.152% 0.122% 0.149% 0.093% 0.154% 0.111%
172 0.234% 0.184% 0.134% 0.108% 0.131% 0.082% 0.135% 0.099%
173 0.966% 0.726% 0.573% 0.435% 0.556% 0.328% 0.577% 0.396%
174 0.097% 0.162% 0.055% 0.095% 0.054% 0.072% 0.056% 0.087%
175 0.049% 0.050% 0.028% 0.029% 0.027% 0.022% 0.028% 0.027%
176 0.165% 0.134% 0.095% 0.079% 0.092% 0.060% 0.095% 0.072%
177 0.916% 0.975% 0.541% 0.591% 0.525% 0.445% 0.545% 0.538%
178 0.533% 0.402% 0.308% 0.238% 0.300% 0.180% 0.311% 0.217%
179 2.842% 3.057% 4.314% 3.161% 3.888% 2.212% 4.221% 2.809%
180 2.851% 3.198% 18.931% 20.552% 24.264% 45.408% 19.532% 29.305%
181 0.247% 0.251% 0.141% 0.148% 0.138% 0.112% 0.143% 0.135%
182 0.227% 0.179% 0.130% 0.105% 0.127% 0.080% 0.131% 0.096%
183 0.059% 0.057% 0.034% 0.034% 0.033% 0.026% 0.034% 0.031%
184 1.621% 1.252% 1.032% 0.774% 0.993% 0.581% 1.035% 0.703%
185 0.346% 0.266% 0.199% 0.157% 0.194% 0.119% 0.201% 0.143%
186 0.206% 0.164% 0.118% 0.096% 0.115% 0.073% 0.119% 0.088%
187 0.365% 0.279% 0.210% 0.165% 0.205% 0.125% 0.212% 0.150%
188 0.277% 0.216% 0.159% 0.127% 0.155% 0.096% 0.160% 0.116%
16 SASCHA KURZ
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COMPUTING THE POWER DISTRIBUTION IN THE IMF 19
Table 13. Exact Banzhaf counts Bzai for supermajority – part 4
i 2015 2016
142 880719880889746205050554576253671936253306729604848 3676265198068175422113349665153212813969097013199656
143 49471727597057335306131923257174325184458483338542 176837594941662819439217298459469758549843454999802
144 113367090641059940461002376473927867025289026259444 502769941764486824601335626776974734248420124375276
145 17796241582555972529647845427695103090190196272002 84659194321239810261578274676558081484774259150292
146 37282994499005042799257701148151378617750538909674 138290369392939768640092980732285176104943285779542
147 302950294620727927003732396031052197317326829457440 992581627260105769126385986812033471596368636275590
148 105006025900540763870469317668724012845234490381094 352821120109159596707036375327612661869380642957788
149 73180984693439693406200627034515880117061928197812 251884499830842143958844795432489463047717781259252
150 17691205754979234292178928303019155739528384162472 76360477059389231712683350684515845654749121565358
151 24790777357630579979483342479008641445722572585636 98799235827482065044783250670716175601137797471248
152 389420016880421449047933347880506266183875295159852 1284054262154075301744682497418517953005384573579774
153 41333121226469003395749040862986612005537642385676 151097028790162650767786073084080138043892572458962
154 703625551700633802084726982256878042484329842530966 4181657616848548563207176698724544125107249686795036
155 102070349966961765938279284905071954117453109851396 343498229809817036864437926031358425560108020217194
156 17376096284502694686549163684710986749876514974292 75364605173663322058106816030054645036028612283986
157 18720542216729127526972664706009320396059585114554 79613620826102780419109963595169781914717519234144
158 17250051670082639430907341724541186252217066309220 74966254934016033883719514175167987709340168795398
159 51128159079360974285208108210994464482278303275382 182077608333638137478019509689555293556453200663636
160 34848211875579916106917624780956215983343591640682 130592319916955844175406739342107995723421104165392
161 26155854249598213262701292724455230519543120787476 121566324765327431359648728539242718213267942870974
162 481155692953027402833353473174228066192983380530142 2711077519641822066086156241138279307208571731608578
163 637628919394053516604696883821764866212434498506142 3280222955914338215512289623169998048499945328489082
164 77070546649325347191726653595313148340944041062670 264206700203543797131414467008497367696168694353984
165 33777634078221453502967232664281089311705126543314 127207657244254074434305043051761718324570981813036
166 57248523770176951578619487804296985377590691066224 201442603541969913869834779977775421894493781004388
167 309220557035229307946192269328507701487898719208898 1013386451603492514808993883262971622376291759042564
168 17775234443743976280090214225778679596111889898336 76626041993094452670764630109376643121981759350686
169 30922442714569656094922886550009124379734917909896 118181392937341946740113947226879966544720598494002
170 16955945759502446396953175832810693075286723447726 74036767774542286259496180358083248325405985503994
171 85845911394652319434031843191384078174242647241428 292020337380272958999468015197140647717577649516026
172 75586052093849638107666891583565350584722758822410 259503393622165553103274100492036189860151479069272
173 312164219168035086597418004447033718209086727614410 1023169367115164421580272840672037686885225450315538
174 31300361240215936383810928286385435535977073098108 227762347842011204935818418693284013134794759786436
175 15884539129744374303611865979490952107271850497608 70650740970442997657136048561732914882735505454096
176 53392258183552849855544344919447653289312881881954 189240595463816273570767781540311263596929251699642
177 295977623071842167691253971024142813986026431224752 1373147646994403720957994798751302411527510718507796
178 172151003057887240432082635769627208313318698559722 566987984410544400059642434915453335938579197185028
179 918367775817962485090852104088421114577954611639702 4307308159804972843954035938800320763350232332137884
180 921227438210417921265982815126428343408780584986592 4506727722110247822679513808100007271801182981184082
181 79766976727463414558895487721181728250758031914148 353878899769397761584099801390661090976220099605868
182 73306484643173074040096084042196759208684701130908 252282033284318092722072486668181262568819094109082
183 19077651144993568321702222711101082031759486721940 80742248729502615043628226096705832123400145418278
184 523715593675375780846911480357914696688526319566394 1764192802606247735182311668928708934414293255783008
185 111912142122300910198074514742074381085150588252818 374764157905662003842361351824920708101981729995764
186 66589541128783380635395841608260717877252403267922 231010130636015903697304858513441780437951514163004
187 117812473763697246341738454407594170620364825779492 393524527557957632210276476880820633320151229597140
188 89561633679521016730626194579619932773406028812900 303803266060147410773398938449545501528813181752666
